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RATCHETING BACK: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AS A CONSTRAINT ON EXECUTIVE 
POWER 
Deborah N. Pearlstein* 
Constitutional scholars have long noted the historic 
tendency of the Executive to accrue power in times of security 
concern. 1 In this respect, the George W. Bush Administration 
might generally be understood to have fulfilled constitutional 
expectations-asserting broad power in the years following the 
devastating attacks of September 11 to detain, interrogate, and 
try suspected terrorists, notwithstanding treaty obligations 
arguably to the contrary.2 As we begin assessing the still new 
Obama Administration, it thus seems necessary to ask whether it 
is fulfilling the closely related constitutional expectation: that 
presidential power over national security only grows over time.3 
By most accounts, the history of executive power relative to the 
other branches has been one of dramatic, often security-driven, 
expansion.4 The expansion is attributed to a number of factors, 
including not only the Executive's institutional ability to act with 
speed and initiative, but also to the domestic and international 
* Visiting Faculty Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Associate 
Research Scholar, Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton 
University. Special thanks to Nandu Machiraju for research assistance. 
1. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (Louis Henkin, Michael J. 
Glennon & William D. Rogers eds., 1990); HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); 
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE 
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2003). 
2. See, e.g., Deborah Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: 
Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1257-68 & n.52 (2006) 
(summarizing aspects of U.S. detention and interrogation policy, and noting potential 
challenges under relevant constitutional and treaty obligations). Uses of the phrase 
"Bush Administration" hereinafter will refer to the Administration of George W. Bush. 
3. See generally KOH, supra note l; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). 
4. See, e.g., KOH, supra note 1; SCHLESINGER, supra note 3; William P. Marshall, 
Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why it Matters, 88 B.U. 
L. REV. 505, 518-19 (2008). 
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political incentives that shape the presidency. As Harold Koh 
put it (writing in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal): "[A] 
pervasive national perception that the presidency must act 
swiftly and secretly to respond to fast-moving international 
events has almost inevitably forced the executive branch into a 
continuing pattern of evasion" of restraint.5 Moreover, far from 
acting as a constraining external force on increasingly bold 
assertions of presidential authority, Congress and especially the 
courts have allowed the President to assert it.6 Together, such 
forces combine to ensure that only a one-way ratchet is applied 
to presidential power. 
Yet the recent change of presidential administration 
provides an intriguing set of examples by which one might 
measure the continued salience of the one-way ratchet paradigm 
in the post-September 11 world. Among other contrasts, the 
Administrations of Bush and Obama would appear by 
composition to differ substantially in their relative commitment 
to international law as a meaningful constraint on national 
power. The Bush Administration had asserted broad executive 
power to resist the application of international law in a way that 
would constrain U.S. counterterrorism operations. It had also 
advanced the view that the power to interpret treaty 
obligations-to "say what the law is" as provided by treaties­
rests primarily or even exclusively with the Executive himself.7 
The interpretation power in particular has been of some 
significance in inter-branch battles past; indeed, 
'"reinterpretation"' had become a central means by which 
Presidents have effectively amended treaty obligations they 
found troubling.8 
In seeming distinction, the Obama Administration thus far 
has been peopled with officials almost certain to hold a contrary 
view. Among others, Legal Adviser to the State Department 
Harold Koh under President Obama has built a career 
advocating for careful adherence to international law as part of 
"our law."9 Obama Administration Director of the State 
5. KOH, supra note 1, at 122. 
6. Id. at 123-49. 
7. See infra passim. 
8. KOH, supra note 1, at 43-45 (discussing the controversy over President 
Reagan's broad reinterpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty). 
9. Harold H. Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, AM. J. INT'L L., Oct. 
2004, at 43; Harold H. Koh, Mark Janis and the American Tradition of International Law, 
21 CONN. J. INT'L L. 191 (2006). 
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Department Office of Policy Planning Anne-Marie Slaughter 
has likewise advocated measures to make international law more 
effective in constraining national power by promoting more 
direct engagement within domestic legal systems.10 Does the 
Obama Administration resist asserting a similar degree of 
interpretive prerogative over international law? Or does the 
one-way ratchet effect prove too great a temptation in this 
regard? 
While it is still early enough in the Obama Administration 
to make any conclusions uncertain, this essay considers a set of 
steps that might be seen to reflect a greater willingness by the 
Administration to acknowledge limits imposed on the Executive 
by treaty commitments, and arguably a greater willingness to 
share power to interpret treaties with the courts. If these early 
indications prove meaningful, they raise a series of questions 
about the political and structural mechanisms said to drive the 
one-way ratchet. In the world of incentives the one-way ratchet 
view describes, why would an Executive move to restore any 
constraints on power? This essay considers the Obama 
Administration's early engagements with the international law 
of armed conflict-and the Geneva Conventions in particular­
in an attempt to explore some potential answers. 
Following a brief background discussion of the longstanding 
debate over the treaty power, this essay highlights a set of 
differences between the Bush and Obama Administrations on 
matters of treaty interpretation in U.S. counterterrorism 
operations. It then considers a series of explanations to account 
for the modest shifts, exploring what if anything these 
differences might tell us about why a nation facing security 
threat would ratchet back claims of executive power in the face 
of international law. 
A note of caution is in order. Extrapolating from individual 
policy decisions to broad state behaviors is always a dicey 
proposition-especially so when there are differences of opinion 
among key decision-makers, and when there are so few 
examples from the current Administration from which to draw. 
The one-way ratchet view in particular might readily discount 
10. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International 
Law is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), 47 HARV. lNT'L L.J. 327, 346 (2006) 
(urging that international law must "push states toward participation in international 
institutions and the international legal system generally so that the functions of 
international law . . .  can take hold and influence state behavior and outcomes"). 
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the significance of any modest evidence of ratcheting back; over 
time, such examples might well appear to be no more than short­
lived blips along what is an otherwise broadly linear trajectory. 
Yet such blips seem important to study-not only because they 
may prove a harbinger of a larger trend, but also because they 
can shed light on the limits of the political and structural 
conditions that have so far stood to explain why U.S. executive 
power trends upwards. If exceptions exist at all, they may tell us 
whether and how those conditions are susceptible to change. 
TREATY POWER DEBATES PRE-2009 IN A NUTSHELL 
Controversy surrounding how much formal power the 
Executive enjoys to interpret or otherwise modify international 
treaty obligations was hardly new to the Bush Administration. 
On one side of the historic debate are those who believe that the 
Executive enjoys substantial power to interpret (even violate) 
treaties as a result of his formal power under Article II of the 
Constitution (to "make" treaties), and his functional advantap;es 
as the "sole organ" of the United States in foreign relations.1 A 
set of twentieth-century Supreme Court statements-noting that 
the "meaning given [treaties] by the departments of government 
particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is 
given great weight"12 -would seem to support this distribution of 
power, with judicial deference doctrine rightly serving as no 
"mere window dressing, but rather [as] a significant factor in 
treaty interpretation. "13 
Others have maintained that whatever limited power the 
Executive has over treaty interpretation is shared, at best, with 
11. John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of 
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 873-74 (2001) (reviewing 
FRANCES FITZGERALD, WAY OUT THERE IN THE BLUE: REAGAN, STAR WARS, AND 
THE END OF THE COLD WAR (2000)); see also Abraham D. Sofaer, The Power Over War, 
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 33 (1995) (arguing that presidential authority to interpret treaties 
and act unilaterally in foreign affairs has a strong historical basis). 
12. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); accord United States v. Stuart, 
489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184--85 
(1982) ; Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 
442 (1921); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913). 
13. Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 
701 (2000) ; see also David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as 
Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439 (1999) (arguing judicial deference 
increased during twentieth century); Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 777 (2008) (arguing that twentieth-century courts deferred regularly to 
"executive pronouncements of foreign affairs"). 
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the independent power of the courts to "say what the law is" 
under Article III.14 True that the Constitution grants the 
Executive the power to "make" treaties,15 but it separately 
allocates primary interpretive power to the courts, extendin� the 
"judicial power" to all cases arising under "treaties made,"1 and 
otherwise making treaties part of the "supreme law of the land" 
to which all state court judges, among others, are bound.17 
Accordingly, the Court has long and rightly exercised its 
independent authority to interpret treaties as it sees fit, with the 
Founding-era Court in particular showing no deference at all to 
Executive views on the meaning of treaties.18 The Court's passing 
language of deference to Executive treaty interpretation has thus 
been "[m]uch like a blimp," a doctrine that seems "ponderous 
but in reality has no weight."19 
In the face of unsettled debates about how much power the 
Executive has to interpret or otherwise confront treaty 
obligations, and correspondingly how much deference the courts 
do, and should, show the Executive's views, the Bush 
Administration pressed an understanding of the executive treaty 
power at the broadest end of the spectrum. In the 
counterterrorism realm, the President's Commander-in-Chief 
power weighed against any construction of the Geneva 
14. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
15. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
16. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1. 
17. U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2, cl. 2; see also Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: 
Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as 'Supreme Law of the 
Land,' 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2120 (1999) ("[T]he framers were virtually of one mind 
when it came to giving treaties the status of law . . . . The imperative need to make 
treaties legally binding on both the states and their citizens was widely recognized by 
1787. The major consequence of this perception was the ready adoption of the supremacy 
clause, which gave treaties the status of law and made them judicially enforceable 
through the federal courts. "' (quoting Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: 
The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. 233, 264 (1984))); Michael 
P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1276-77 
(2002) (arguing, inter alia, that in light of the Framers' understanding of the separation of 
powers, a commitment to the Executive of the power to "make" treaties would preclude 
the vesting in the same branch of the power to interpret them); 
18. See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretation: A 
Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497 (2007). 
19. Martin Flaherty, Globalization and Executive Power 5-20 (Dec. 22, 1006, 
unpublished manuscript on file with author). In any case, it is not possible to demonstrate 
either a logical or actual causal relationship between deference to the Executive's views 
per se and the outcome of the Court's treaty decisions. Robert M. Chesney, 
Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretation, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 1723 (2007) (surveying published opinions of the federal judiciary between 
1984-2005). 
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Conventions (regulating armed conflict) that would have the 
effect of constraining executive power. As an early memo from 
the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
explained in construing the scope of Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions so as not to cover the U.S. conflict with al­
Qaeda: " [T]he Commander-in-Chief power gives the President 
the plenary authority in determining how best to deploy troops 
in the field. Any congressional effort to restrict presidential 
authority by subjecting the conduct of the U.S. Armed Forces to 
a broad construction of the Geneva Convention, one that is not 
clearly borne by its text, would represent a possible infringement 
on president discretion to direct the military."2° Common Article 
3 contains a set of basic restrictions on the treatment and trial of 
detainees in armed conflicts that may involve non-state parties. 
Yet absent a clear statement from Congress-in the federal War 
Crimes Act or elsewhere-that the kind of armed conflicts 
Common Article 3 references meant to include the "war on 
terror," OLC advised, Common Article 3 should be read to 
avoid the constitutional problem that would arise in interfering 
with the President's authority to wage a transnational "war" 
against al-Qaeda.21 
At the same time, in scholarly pages and m 
contemporaneous OLC memoranda, Administration attorneys 
argued that Article II of the Constitution grants the President 
"plenary" power over treaties.22 Article II's grant of the 
undefined "executive power," along with the express authority 
to "make treaties," required an understanding that any treaty­
related powers not specifically mentioned in Article II­
including the power to interpret, and the greater power to 
terminate or suspend treaties unilaterally-must be understood 
to rest with the President. "Construing the Constitution to grant 
20. Memorandum from John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, U.S. Dep't of Justice 
Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. 
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002) 
[hereinafter Haynes Memo], in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 38, 
47 (Karen Greenberg & Joshua J. Dratel eds., 2005). 
21. Id. 
22. See, Yoo, Politics as Law?, supra note 11, at 869-70; Memorandum from John 
Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to John 
Bellinger, III, Senior Assoc. Counsel to the President and Legal Adviser to the Nat'l Sec. 
Council, Re: Authority of the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM 
Treaty 6 & n.6 (Nov. 15, 2001) [hereinafter Yoo ABM Memo], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memoabmtreaty11152001.pdf; Haynes Memo, supra note 
20, at 47. 
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unenumerated treaty authority to another branch could prevent 
the President from exercising his core constitutional 
responsibilities in foreign affairs."23 Accordingly, while "the 
Court has an independent duty under Article III to determine 
the meaning of a treaty in a case in which such a question is 
properly presented," the Court must "give[] the executive's 
interpretation of the treaty significant deference."24 Indeed, OLC 
asserted, the President is the "primary interpreter of 
international law and of treaties on behalf of the United 
States. "25 
The Bush Administration's internal views on the President's 
treaty authority was soon reflected in its litigating positions. In 
defending its authority to detain U.S. citizen Y aser Hamdi as an 
"enemy combatant" in the U.S. conflict in Afghanistan, the 
Administration insisted that the legal question whether 
"captured enemy combatants are entitled to POW privileges 
23. Yoo ABM Memo, supra note 22, at 6. 
24. Id. at n.6. 
25. Id. at 6-7. The Bush Administration was hardly the first Administration to 
assert executive power over treaty interpretation. The Clinton Administration OLC 
maintained that it "belongs exclusively to the President to interpret and execute 
treaties." Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legal Counsel, to John Quinn, Counsel to the President (June 26, 1996), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/abmjq.htm#N_ 4_. But this claim was limited to the 
unremarkable notion that executive power to interpret treaties follows as a necessary 
corollary of the President's duty to "take Care" that the laws are faithfully executed. Id. 
(citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 and advising that "[t]he executive branch interprets the 
requirements of an agreement as it carries out its provisions." (citation omitted)). The 
modest position that the executive must have at least some power to interpret the law, if 
only enough to ensure its implementation, poses no necessary threat to the "judicial 
power," a power limited by the express recognition that the courts will only decide those 
disputes emergent enough to constitute a case or controversy. It likewise implies no 
answer to the question which of the two branches' interpretation deserves primacy when 
they conflict-the separation of powers question at issue in the deference debate. In 
contrast, Bush Administration assertions of executive interpretive authority in this 
context rested not on the President's duty to execute the law, but on the Article II 
vesting and treaty clauses. Yoo ABM Memo, supra note 22, at 6-7. And they were 
closely tied to assertions of the limits of judicial and legislative power in the face of 
executive authority. See Yoo ABM Memo, supra note 22, at 6 ("Even in the cases in 
which the Supreme Court has limited executive authority, it has also emphasized that we 
should not construe legislative prerogatives to prevent the executive branch 'from 
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."' (quoting Nixon v. Administrator 
of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977))); see also Memorandum from Sheldon 
Bradshaw & Robert J. Delahunty, U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to the 
Senior Associate Counsel to the President & National Security Council Legal Adviser, 
Re: Constitutionality of the Rohrabacher Amendment 7-8 (July 25, 2001), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/72501op.pdf ("[I]nsofar as Congress is seeking to direct the 
Executive Branch to advocate Congress's interpretation of the treaty, it is usurping a 
constitutional power that does not belong to it."). 
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under the [Third Geneva Convention] is a quintessential matter 
that the Constitution (not to mention the [Third Geneva 
Convention]) leaves to the political branches and, in particular, 
the President."26 To be clear, this was not a particular 
determination by the President of a detainee's eligibility for 
POW status on the facts. This was a generalized conclusion 
about the relevance of the Third Geneva Convention to a 
conflict between two state parties to the treaty (the United 
States and Afghanistan) .  Again when the Supreme Court took 
up Salim Hamdan's later challenge to the legality of military 
commission proceedings at Guantanamo Bay, the 
Administration argued vigorously for judicial abstention in the 
first instance, and broad deference in the second, on the 
interpretation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions-a provision requiring, inter alia, that trials be held 
in a "regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples. "27 
It was in direct response to the Supreme Court's rejection of 
the government's position in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the 
Administration sought and won passage of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA I) . In addition to providing 
legislative authorization for the tribunals the Court had found 
inconsistent with Geneva Common Article 3 (among other 
laws), MCA I provided that "[n]o alien unlawful enemy 
combatant subject to trial by military commission under this 
chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of 
rights. "28 It also attempted in Section 6 to clarify any question of 
who had authority to interpret the Geneva Conventions: 
As provided by the Constitution and by this section, the 
President has the authority for the United States to interpret the 
meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions and to 
26. Brief for the Respondents at *24 & n.9, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) 
(No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020 ("The President-the highest 'competent authority' on 
the subject-has conclusively determined that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, including 
Hamdi, do not qualify for POW privileges under the [Third Geneva Convention]. . . .  The 
President's determination is based on the fact that al Qaeda and Taliban fighters 
systematically do not follow the law of war and therefore do not qualify as lawful 
combatants under Article 4 of the [Third Geneva Convention], entitled to POW 
privileges.") (internal citations omitted). 
27. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631-32 (2006) (citing the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
3320, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (Art. 3, <J[ l(d))). 
28. 10 u .s.c. § 948(b) (2009). 
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promulgate higher standards and administrative regulations 
for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions.29 · 
531 
Pursuant to that authority, which also called for the issuance of 
an Executive Order to explain how Geneva's anti-torture 
restrictions were to apply to U.S. interrogation operations, 
President Bush issued an Executive Order in 2007 setting forth 
his interpretation of Common Article 3's parallel strictures on 
the humane treatment of detainees. In it, the President read 
section 6 of MCA I as "reaffirm[ing] and reinforc[ing] the 
authority of the President to interpret the meaning and 
application of the Geneva Conventions."30 The President's Order 
thus provided that "a program" of detention and interrogation, 
operated by the CIA and described in vague terms in the Order, 
complied with the requirements of Common Article 3. Lest 
there be any doubt, the Order stated that with respect to the 
interpretation and application of Common Article 3, the Order 
was to be "treated as authoritative for all purposes as a matter of 
United States law, including satisfaction of the international 
obligations of the United States."31 
CLUES TO THE OBAMA APPROACH 
If the one-way ratchet theory is correct, one might expect to 
find signs that the Obama Administration is reaching out to 
reinforce, or at least not cede, the primacy of the Executive's 
views in treaty interpretation, and otherwise to limit the role of 
international law in constraining executive power. Yet while 
published OLC memoranda discussing the Obama 
Administration's views of international law in this realm are 
scarce, what early evidence is available suggests that the pattern 
may not be quite so clear. Indeed, the President's most detailed 
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006) (emphasis added). The remainder of Section A 
provided: "(B) The President shall issue interpretations described Federal Register, by 
subparagraph (A) by Executive Order published in the publication. (C) Any Executive 
Order published under this paragraph shall be authoritative (except as to grave breaches 
of common Article 3) as a matter of United States law, in the same manner as other 
administrative regulations. (D) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the 
constitutional functions and responsibilities of Congress and the judicial branch of the 
United States." Relatedly, Section 5 of MCA I barred any person from "invok[ing]" the 
Geneva Conventions as a "source of rights" in any court of the United States. 
30. Exec. Order No. 13,440(b ), 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13440.htm. 
31. Id. 
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rhetoric on the role of the international law of armed conflict 
offered a vigorous defense of the virtues of binding obligations 
under international law: 
Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic 
interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. And 
even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no 
rules, I believe that the United States of America must remain 
a standard bearer in the conduct of war . .. .  [T]hat is why I 
have reaffirmed America's commitment to abide by the 
Geneva Conventions. We lose ourselves when we 
compromise the very ideals that we fight to defend. And we 
honor those ideals by upholding them not just when it is easy, 
but when it is hard. 32 
The President's first acts in office seemed broadly consistent 
with such rhetoric, and included the repeal of President Bush's 
Executive Order 13440 regarding the meaning of Common 
Article 3 as applied to U.S. interrogation operations. In an 
Executive Order that itself made no mention of MCA I, Section 
6, or to comparable claims of presidential authority to interpret 
international law, the Obama Executive Order affirmed that 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions was among the 
sources of law constraining the behavior of U.S. interrogators. 
The Order also strikingly prohibited any "officers, employees, 
and other agents" conducting interrogations for the U.S. 
Government from relying on any interpretation of Common 
Article 3 issued by the Department of Justice between 
September 11, 2001, and January 20, 2009. 33 
Likewise, the Obama Administration separately pursued 
and won passage of a revised Military Commissions Act (MCA 
32. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of 
the Nobel Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Nobel Peace Prize], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace­
prize. Note OLC opinions would be a more instructive guide to the Administration's 
understanding of the legal effect of the Conventions, but few have been made public and 
none of those that have shed light on current understandings of the effect of treaty 
obligations on executive power. The President's most direct formal address on the 
dilemmas posed by Guantanamo Bay and related detention practices likewise said 
nothing detailed about the applicability of international law per se. Delivered at the U.S. 
National Archives, steps from the U.S. Constitution, the speech referred more broadly to 
the rule of law and concerns of due process generally than to any particular legal source. 
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security, (May 21, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the­
President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/. 
33. Exec. Order 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
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II), enacted in November 2009.34 In addition to amending the 
procedures to be followed in military commission war crimes 
trials (in a direction generally more favorable to commission 
defendants), MCA II removed an express provision in the earlier 
law limiting the ability of commission defendants to invoke the 
Geneva Conventions.35 MCA I had provided: "No alien unlawful 
enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under 
this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of 
rights. "3 In the new law, that provision is replaced with a more 
modest restriction, a prohibition against commission defendants 
invoking Geneva as "a basis for a private right of action."37 
Where the earlier restriction could be read to prevent 
commission defendants from invoking Geneva as any "source of 
rights," even in defense against a criminal action against them, 
MCA II appeared to prevent defendants only from relying on 
Geneva to create a separate cause of action in federal court. Put 
differently, while the Geneva Conventions might not afford 
commission defendants a ticket to get into court in the absence 
of a separate basis for federal court jurisdiction, the Conventions 
would remain available as applicable law-including as a rule of 
decision -for any alien already properly in court. 
Perhaps the Obama Administration's most significant 
engagement on the relevance of international law to 
counterterrorism operations-and its most direct engagement on 
the role of the courts in sharing interpretive authority-has been 
through its ongoing litigation over the detention of some 180 
individuals at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
Commenced under the Bush Administration, habeas cases 
brought by these detainees have since turned to consider the 
substantive scope of executive authority to detain individuals 
under the statutory Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF), passed by Congress in 2001.38 While the AUMF itself 
is silent on the question of detention per se, the Supreme Court 
34. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009). 
35. 10 u.s.c. § 948(b) (2009). 
36. 10 u.s.c. § 948b(g) (2007). 
37. Id. § 948b(e) (2009). 
38. The AUMF authorizes the use of "all necessary and appropriate force" against 
those "nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons." Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 
224-25. 
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held in 2004 that the AUMF at a minimum extended to 
authorize the detention of individuals who were "part of or 
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition 
partners' in Afghanistan and who 'engaged in an armed conflict 
against the United States' there."39 Whether the AUMF could be 
read to authorize the detention of a broader set of individuals­
including those captured outside Afghanistan, or including those 
merely "supporting" hostilities without being directly engaged­
has been a central question in recent litigation.40 While the Bush 
and Obama Administrations have in some respects put forward 
substantially similar substantive definitions of who may be 
detained under this authority,41 Obama Administration briefs 
embrace the relevance of international law in understanding the 
scope of the A UMF to a far greater degree. Likewise, where 
Bush Administration demands for judicial deference to the 
interpretive views of the Executive were prominent, Obama 
Administration briefs have largely relegated discussions of the 
applicable degree of deference to the footnotes. 
Consider the Administrations' relative briefing on the scope 
of the government's power to hold "enemy combatant" 
detainees in military custody. The Bush Administration filed 
unclassified judicial briefs setting forth a detailed understanding 
of the scope of its authority to hold such detainees on a number 
of occasions. In none of them did it rely on the international law 
of armed conflict as either a font of authority or effective 
39. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) 
(emphasis added); see also id. at 521 ("[W]e understand Congress' grant of authority for 
the use of 'necessary and appropriate force' to include the authority to detain for the 
duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on long-standing law-of­
war principles."). 
40. See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009); al-Maqaleh v. 
Gates, 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009). 
41. Compare Respondents' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus at 8, al-Maqaleh 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (No. 1:06-cv-01669) [hereinafter 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss], available at http://sites.google.com/a/ijnetwork.org/ 
maqaleh-v--gates/test-joint-appendix (follow "Maqaleh v. Gates, 1:06-cv-01669, Dkt. 18, 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, filed September 15, 2008" hyperlink) with Memorandum from Frank Sweigart, 
Dir. of Office of the Admin. Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. 
Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Department of Defense, Procedure for Review of 
"New Evidence" Relating to Enemy Combatant (EC) Status (May 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/May2007/New%20Evidence%20Instruction.pdf. See also 
William Glaberson, President's Detention Plan Tests American Legal Tradition, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 22, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/23/us/politics/ 
23detain.html. 
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limitation on the power of the U.S. Executive.42 On the contrary, 
while maintaining that adequate detention authority could be 
found in the President's Article II powers standing alone, the 
Bush Administration understood the AUMF as an additional 
source of authority for detention under which the Executive's 
definition of "enemy combatants" was a "reasonable 
implementation of the President's responsibility to 'determine' 
the object of the use of force authorized by the AUMF," a 
determination subject to "the widest latitude of judicial 
interpretation. "43 To the extent the international law of armed 
conflict was relevant to defining who may be detained under the 
AUMF, it was only in rebuttal to detainees' arguments to that 
effect.44 Indeed, the Administration had rejected arguments that 
the Geneva Conventions could be invoked by detainees seeking 
habeas relief at all on the grounds that, inter alia, (1) Geneva 
"supplies no basis for granting habeas relief because it is not self­
executing" and therefore "does not confer any privately 
enforceable rights," and (2) the President's determination that 
the Geneva rules protected neither al-Qaeda nor Taliban 
fighters was conclusive as a matter of law .45 
In contrast, the Obama Administration's opening legal brief 
setting forth its position on the scope of the government's 
detention authority over the detainees at Guantanamo Bay is 
shot through with reference to and reliance on international law. 
In addition to abandoning the Bush Administration argument 
that Article II of the Constitution itself provides adequate, 
independent authorization for the President to detain individuals 
engaged in armed conflict against the United States, the brief 
states at the outset that "[t]he detention authority conferred by 
the AUMF is necessarily informed by principles of the laws of 
war," a body of law that includes "prohibitions and obligations" 
either "codified in treaties such as the Geneva Conventions" or 
recognized as "customary international law."46 Indeed, while 
42. See Respondents' Statement of Legal Justification for Detention, In re 
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig. (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008) (Misc. No. 08-442) (summary 
filing locating the source of executive detention power in Article II and the AUMF, 
without citation to Geneva Conventions). 
43. Brief for the Respondents, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-
1195, 06-1196). 
44. Id. 
45. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 26. 
46. Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority 
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In Re Guantanamo Bay Detainee 
Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (D.D.C. Mar.13, 2009) [hereinafter Respondents' 
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acknowledging that the law of armed conflict was less well 
developed for conflicts between states and armed groups (as 
opposed to conflicts between state powers alone), the brief 
maintained that "[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules 
governing international [state-to-state] armed conflicts" must 
nonetheless inform the interpretation of the scope of authority 
granted by the AUMF.47 Relying on the United Nations Charter, 
as well as UN and NATO resolutions adopted in the wake of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States affirming the 
right of states to individual or collective self-defense, the brief 
understands the A UMF as, among other things, invoking "the 
internationally recognized right to self-defense."48 The only 
mention of judicial deference comes eventually in a footnote 
arguing that the court should defer to "the President's judgment 
that the AUMF, construed in light of the law-of-war principles 
that inform its interpretation, entitle[ s] him to treat members of 
irregular forces as state military forces are treated for purposes 
of detention."49 Notably, this appears to seek "deference" from 
the court not so the President may treat detainees under the 
AUMF however he thinks "necessary and appropriate" (in the 
language of the AUMF) or to a determination that the 
Guantanamo detainees are entitled to lesser or no protection 
under the law of war because they are not regular fighters (as the 
Bush Administration had maintained), but to a determination 
that irregular forces are entitled to the same status as state 
military forces "for purposes of detention." In other words, one 
could read the brief as seeking deference to the notion that 
Geneva imposes greater duties of protection upon the Executive 
than courts (or the previous Administration) had thus far 
recognized. 
REWINDING THE ONE-WAY RATCHET? 
Such a passing collection of examples provides an 
admittedly modest basis for drawing broad conclusions about the 
habits of executives once in power. Nonetheless, it seems worth 
Memorandum]. 
47. Respondents' Memorandum, supra note 46, at 3 (U.S. authority to hold 
Guantanamo detainees "is derived from the AUMF, which empowers the President to 
use all necessary and appropriate force to prosecute the war, in light of law-of-war 
principles that inform the understanding of what is 'necessary and appropriate"'). 
48. Respondents' Memorandum, supra note 46, at 4-5. 
49. Id. at 6 n.2. 
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considering what if anything the relative difference in approach 
taken by the two administrations tells us about the nature of 
shifts in executive power-and the potential role of international 
law in achieving any moderating effect. We might usefully 
consider a range of possibilities below in attempting to explain 
the forces motivating the seeming shift in executive engagement 
with the Geneva regime. The options are not meant to be 
mutually exclusive; indeed, it seems likely that more than one 
explanation is required to understand an administration's 
behavior-and the behavior of the multiple constituencies within 
each administration. Still, each explanation carries different 
implications for the salience of the one-way ratchet theory, and 
it is helpful to unpack them separately. We begin with the 
possibility of least significance to the one-way ratchet view­
namely, Bush-to-Obama has seen no real change in 
understanding of the constraints imposed by international law at 
all. 
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PAPER TIGER 
A first potential response to the account of shifting 
language above is that it is all rhetoric, no reality. While the 
Obama Administration's speeches and even legal briefs may 
invoke international law with more frequency or attention than 
did its predecessor administration, in fact the result is effectively 
the same. In particular, the Obama Administration continues to 
maintain that the United States is engaged in an ongoing global 
armed conflict of indefinite duration against a terrorist 
organization, and that it therefore has the authority to detain a 
broad swath of "belligerents" at Guantanamo Bay (and in 
Afghanistan) ,  a category of individuals that includes members 
and mere "supporters" of al-Qaeda, wherever they may be 
seized.50 The Administration may believe international law is 
50. Compare Respondents' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus at 24, al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009) (Nos. 06-
1668, 08-1307, 08-2143)), with Brief for the Respondents at 67, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196). The Obama Administration has likewise taken 
the position in briefing that detainees held at the newly built U.S. detention facility at 
Parwan at Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan (the successor prison to the Bagram Theater 
Internment Facility) are not entitled to seek habeas corpus in U.S. federal courts. 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 41, at 2-3. At the same time, the 
Administration has taken aggressive steps to transfer detention operations in 
Afghanistan to the Afghans, in keeping with an effort to bring the United States in line 
with international legal obligations. STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL, COMMANDER'S INITIAL 
ASSESSMENT at F-1 (2009), available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ 
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relevant to understanding the scope of the AUMF, but it also 
effectively contends that international law allows it to do 
precisely what the Bush Administration insisted it could do 
under differently cast legal authority. Likewise, President 
Obama may have issued an Executive Order reqmnng 
compliance in interrogations with Common Article 3, but as the 
Obama Order itself demonstrates, Executive Orders are readily 
subject to revision. It could easily issue a contrary Executive 
Order tomorrow. And while the new Military Commissions Act 
may allow detainees to raise Geneva Convention rights in 
defense against war crimes prosecution, Convention law is 
notoriously vague on what in fact is meant by Common Article 
3's guarantee of "all the judicial guarantees which are recognized 
as indispensable by civilized peoples. "51 Given the scope of 
procedural rights already available to Commission defendants,52 
the Conventions per se are unlikely to require the 
Administration to behave any differently than it would already 
under existing statutory (and constitutional) requirements. In 
this regard, the fact that the Administration cites international 
legal obligations has no bearing at all on the scope of the power 
it in fact asserts. Indeed, it asserts just as much power as the 
predecessor regime. At worst, international law is used to 
provide additional diplomatic-and legal-cover for pursuing 
policies that expand executive power further. 
The paper tiger account is tempting in a number of respects, 
most especially in its description of the relative similarity of 
detention policies between the post-Boumediene Bush 
Administration (confronting detainees' constitutional 
entitlement to seek ��beas . co�pus � and th� pre-Guanta.na�o 
closure Obama Admm1strat1on. - Still, the view that nothmg m 
practice has changed seems to give short shrift to recent 
Administration behavior in invoking international law. For one 
thing, some of the Administration's invocations of international 
law were in fact accompanied by the specific rejection of a 
politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. ("It is critical that we continue to 
develop and build capacity to empower the Afghan government to conduct all detentions 
operations in this country in accordance with international and national law."); see also 
Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New Facility for Afghan Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/l 1/16/world/asia/16bagram.html? _r=2. 
51. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(discussing procedural rules emerging from Common Article 3). 
52. 28 U.S.C. 2241, et seq. 
53. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
J 
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broader assertion of practical power by the pnor 
Administration. The Bush Administration maintained that it 
enjoyed the power, for instance, to subject terrorist suspects to a 
form of mock execution by drowning (often called 
waterboarding).54 The Obama Administration has renounced 
that power.55 The Bush Administration embraced rules for 
military commissions that permitted the admissibility of 
testimony obtained under "cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment" under certain circumstances.56 The Obama 
Administration's revised military commission bill bars the use of 
such testimony.57 The Bush Administration maintained that 
Congress and even the courts were limited in their authority to 
determine the meaning of treaties by virtue of the President's 
own formal constitutional power over treaty interpretation.58 The 
Obama Administration has to date advanced no such 
d d. 59 un erstan mg. 
Perhaps more important, even if one accepts the argument 
that the Obama Administration's references to the constraints of 
international law are more rhetorical than real, the question 
remains why an Executive would change even its rhetorical 
54. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for 
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, 2004 WL 3554701 (O.L.C.) (Dec. 30, 
2004); COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE 
TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY (Comm. Print 2008), available at 
http://armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee % 20Report % 20Final_April % 
2022 %202009.pdf. 
55. Senate Confirmation Hearings: Eric Holder, Day One, Wash. Post 11 (Jan. 16, 
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0l/16/us/politics/16text-holder. 
html?pagewanted=ll. It is true that executive orders are easily revoked, but all law could 
of course be changed pursuant to appropriate procedures; the prospect that the law 
might change does not undermine the binding nature of the legal obligation during the 
time it exists. 
56. 10 U.S.C. § 948r. 
57. Id. § 948r(a). 
58. See, e.g., Yoo, Politics as Law?, supra note 11, at 869-77 (arguing this in the 
context of the ABM treaty); Yoo ABM Memo, supra note 22, at 6 & n.6 (making the 
argument in the context of the ABM treaty again); Haynes Memo, supra note 20, at 47 
(arguing this in the context of the Geneva Conventions). 
59. Indeed, a federal appeals court recently rejected the Obama Administration's 
position that international law must be understood as informing the interpretation of the 
AUMF. al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("The international laws of 
war as a whole have not been implemented domestically by Congress and are therefore 
not a source of authority for U.S. courts . . . .  Therefore, while the international laws of 
war are helpful to courts when identifying the general set of war powers to which the 
AUMF speaks, their lack of controlling legal force and firm definition render their use 
both inapposite and inadvisable when courts seek to determine the limits of the 
President's war powers." (citations omitted)). 
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stance toward treaty law in a way that might imply a limit on 
power previously asserted. One can imagine various answers to 
this question as well -and some are considered in the discussion 
of alternative explanations for recent shifts below. But the most 
basic explanation for the Executive's one-way ratchet 
tendencies-the existence of political incentives that drive 
Presidents to claim more power rather than less-does not seem 
to explain why a President would make such a rhetorical move. 
On the contrary, if domestic political posturing were the most 
salient explanation, one might equally imagine a new President 
moving visibly-even if not practically-to embrace and 
consolidate broader authority by rejecting international law 
constraints conclusively.60 
B. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LITIGATION STRATEGY 
A second possible reading of Obama Administration 
actions would acknowledge that the Administration has shifted 
posture somewhat-at least rhetorically and in some respects 
practically-to recognize legal constraints posed by treaty 
obligations, but would attribute the Administration's behavior to 
savvy and necessary litigation strategy in the numerous Geneva­
related cases that have moved and are moving through the 
domestic federal courts. Since 2001, the Supreme Court has 
issued a series of decisions recognizing to varying degrees the 
relevance of international law to executive policies of detention 
and trial. Most significant among these: the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
plurality opinion in 2004, which made no mention of judicial 
deference to the Executive and expressly construed the AUMF 
in light of "longstanding law-of-war principles";61 and Hamdan, 
two years later, in which the Court was even more aggressively 
non-deferential to executive treaty interpretation, squarely 
rejecting the Bush Administration's position that Common 
Article 3 did not apply to the conflict in Afghanistan.62 It is on 
these two issues in particular-the relevance of international law 
to the interpretation of the AUMF and the applicability of 
Common Article 3 to interrogation operations-that the Obama 
60. See Heidi Kitrosser, National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26 CONST. 
COMMENT. 483 (2010) (describing public opinion polls finding that many Americans, and 
sometimes majorities, support counterterrorism practices involving "heavy force," 
including harsh interrogation techniques such as waterboarding). 
61. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
62. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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Administration has been most aggressive in embracing the 
constraints of international law. Under the circumstances, 
Administration attorneys would have been foolish at best not to 
recognize the implications of such holdings in its policy positions 
and legal briefs. 
At the same time, where the courts have been less vocal in 
checking executive prerogatives, the Obama position has 
remained largely unchanged from the Bush position. Recall, for 
example, that the Supreme Court issued a ruling much more 
favorable to the Executive in Munaf v. Geren,63 an often 
overlooked 2008 decision in which the Court reached out to 
decide the merits of a habeas petition filed by Americans held by 
U.S. forces in Iraq. Among other claims, the Americans had 
argued that U.S. obligations under the Convention Against 
Torture (and federal implementing regulations) barred the 
United States from transferring them to the Iraqis for criminal 
prosecution given the likelihood that they would face torture in 
Iraqi custody.64 While the Court avoided deciding key aspects of 
the transfer question as a matter of law, it took an enormously 
deferential stance toward the Executive's factual determination 
that the United States had received adequate assurances from 
the Iraqis that the Americans would be reasonably treated.65 In 
parallel contrast, the Obama Administration's position on its 
63. 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008). 
64. Id. at 2226 & n.6 (2008) (citing Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, adopted Jan. 9, 1975, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 6 (1988) ("No State Party shall expel, return 
('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture") (addressing claims 
under Foreign Affairs Restructuring and Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. 
G, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (1998)). 
65. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2226 (2008) ("In these cases the United States explains 
that, although it remains concerned about torture among some sectors of the Iraqi 
Government, the State Department has determined that the Justice Ministry-the 
department that would have authority over Munaf and Omar-as well as its prison and 
detention facilities have 'generally met internationally accepted standards for basic 
prisoner needs.' The Solicitor General explains that such determinations are based on 
'the Executive's assessment of the foreign country's legal system and . . . the 
Executive['s] . . .  ability to obtain foreign assurances it considers reliable.' The Judiciary 
is not suited to second-guess such determinations-determinations that would require 
federal courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and undermine the 
Government's ability to speak with one voice in this area. In contrast, the political 
branches are well situated to consider sensitive foreign policy issues, such as whether 
there is a serious prospect of torture at the hands of an ally, and what to do about it if 
there is. As Judge Brown noted, 'we need not assume the political branches are oblivious 
to these concerns. Indeed, the other branches possess significant diplomatic tools and 
leverage the judiciary lacks."') (internal citations omitted). 
542 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:523 
authority to transfer terrorist suspects from one country to 
another outside standard extradition channels -the practice of 
so-called 'extraordinary rendition' -has been little changed from 
the Bush Administration. Indeed, the Obama Administration 
early on moved to embrace the existing executive view that 
diplomatic assurances are an adequate means for guarding 
against the transfer of individuals to countries where they may 
face torture.66 Where the Court's decisions had not clearly 
compelled otherwise, the Administration thus embraced the 
generally broad authority the past President asserted, despite the 
evidently broad swath of international law regulating interstate 
transfers. In short, the argument proceeds, the Obama 
Administration has ceded power claimed by the Bush 
Administration only to the extent that it has been compelled to 
do so by the domestic courts. Such behavior should not, 
therefore, be understood as bearing on that aspect of the one­
way ratchet theory that maintains that executives have no 
political or institutional incentive to willingly cede power their 
predecessors have effectively seized. In this case, there is nothing 
'willing' about it. 
It may well be the case that the Obama Administration's 
relatively greater embrace of international legal constraints in 
this realm can be attributed at least in part to its realistic 
assessment of the domestic legal consequences of a contrary 
view. But some caution may be in order before concluding that 
litigation is a complete explanation. First, the Supreme Court's 
rulings in Hamdi and Hamdan only went so far. They did not of 
themselves compel the Administration to take any action with 
respect to interrogation policy per se; nor did they require the 
Administration to ease restrictions on the invocation of the 
Geneva Conventions by defendants in military commission 
trials. And while the Court was far from deferential to the 
Executive's interpretation of international law in either case, the 
Court hardly precluded Executives from raising strong 
arguments in favor of judicial deference or abstention in the 
future. Yet while Obama Administration briefs are not devoid of 
requests for judicial deference to executive treaty 
interpretation-indeed, obligations of zealous advocacy would 
seem to require Administration lawyers to invoke whatever such 
66. Greg Miller, Obama Preserves Renditions as a Counter-Terrorism Tool, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/Ol/nation/ 
na+renditionl. 
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arguments are reasonably available-such demands are notably 
muted compared to the previous Administration. Perhaps more 
striking than the Guantanamo brief described above, the 
Administration recently filed a brief urging the Supreme Court 
to deny certiorari in the case of Manuel Noriega, the sole official 
"prisoner of war" currently in U.S. custody. Noriega had argued 
unsuccessfully in federal habeas court that the Third Geneva 
Convention requirement of repatriation at the conclusion of 
hostilities precluded the United States from extraditing him to 
France to face criminal prosecution. 67 The United States had 
vigorously disputed this reading of the Convention on its merits, 
and the Obama Administration reasserted that argument in its 
Supreme Court brief. But far from the Bush Administration's 
position in Hamdi that the President's views on the applicability 
of Geneva to the Afghan conflict was "conclusive" as a matter of 
law on the Court,68 the Obama Administration made a far more 
modest claim-namely that the Executive's views on the 
meaning of the treaty were entitled to a degree of "respect,"69 a 
notably lesser degree of deference than "great weight" on the 
continuum of standards usually discussed.70 One might conceive 
of a litigation strategy that makes it sensible for the Executive to 
demand less deference from the Court than it believes it 
deserves. But the strategic motivation from a litigation 
perspective is far from obvious. 
Perhaps more important, even if litigation strategy were a 
67. Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
68. Brief for the Respondents supra note 26, at 23-24 ("Both Article 5 and the 
military's regulations call for a military tribunal only when there is 'doubt' as to an 
individual's 'legal status' under the [Third Geneva Convention] to receive POW 
privileges, and not as to each and every captured combatant. In the case of Hamdi and 
the other al Qaeda and Taliban detainees in the current conflict, there is no such doubt. 
The President-the highest 'competent authority' on the subject-has conclusively 
determined that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, including Hamdi, do not qualify for 
POW privileges under the [Third Geneva Convention]."). 
69. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at *11-12, Noriega, 130 S.Ct. 1002 
(2010) (No. 09-35), 2009 WL 2904602 ("[T]he court of appeals' conclusion that 
petitioner's extradition to France is not barred by the Third Geneva Convention is a 
reasonable construction of the convention that comports with its text and overall 
purposes. The court of appeals' reading is also consistent with the views of the Executive 
Branch, which are entitled to respect." (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 
457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) ("Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty 
provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement 
is entitled to great weight."))). 
70. William Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1083 (2008). 
544 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:523 
complete answer, there are reasons to pause before concluding 
from this that the Administration's relative acceptance of greater 
international legal constraints poses no challenge to the one-way 
ratchet view. On the contrary, the success of the one-way ratchet 
approach to presidential power has been thought to depend not 
only on executive incentives, but also on the existence of an 
equal and opposite set of incentives by Congress and particularly 
the courts. That is, the one-way ratchet has worked because the 
President's propensity to seek power has been met by the 
judiciary's propensity to let him have it.71 If the President is now 
in fact reining in assertions of authority in response to judicial 
push-back, the litigation strategy explanation is in this sense an 
argument that the ratchet mechanism is not altogether 
functioning as expected. 
C. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS TRANSNATIONAL PROCESS 
A third set of potential explanations poses perhaps the 
greatest challenge to the one-way ratchet view. Consider next 
that the Obama Administration is indeed responding to political 
incentives as the one-way ratchet view contemplates, but those 
incentives are, in this instance, pushing the Administration to 
seek greater constraints on its power. From the rich literature on 
why states comply with international law,72 one might explain the 
phenomenon in various ways. On one view, the Obama 
Administration's early behavior is a case study in the 
transnational legal process explanation of why states comply 
with international law. The notion here, advanced by Harold 
Koh among others, is that once a nation enters a regime of 
international legal rules-say, the rules regulating armed 
conflict-its bureaucracy and governing apparatus are drawn 
into a dialectic engagement with a range of governmental and 
nongovernmental actors seeking to ensure the mutual domestic 
internalization of those rules.73 As those rules become 
internalized by domestic legal and social structures and 
institutions, they themselves function to ensure ongoing 
compliance.74 If such a mechanism is at work here, the Obama 
71. KOH, supra note 1, at 134-49. 
72. See generally FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Harold H. Koh & 
Oona A. Hathaway eds., 2005) (reviewing and assembling literature). 
73. Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 
2651 (1997). 
74. Id. (describing transnational legal process as "the evolutionary process whereby 
repeated compliance gradually becomes habitual obedience."). 
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Administration is simply manifesting the political success such 
transnational actors have had during the past eight years in 
forcing the more effective internalization of Geneva rules. 
Transnational nongovernmental organizations, the news 
media, academic advocates, and civil society more broadly can 
indeed make a strong case of having played an instrumental role 
in bringing about what change has occurred. It was hardly an 
accident that the group flanking President Obama in the Oval 
Office when he signed the early Executive Order mandating 
compliance with Common Article 3 was a collection of retired 
U.S. admirals and generals.75 The group had been catalyzed and 
organized over a period of years by the NGO Human Rights 
First, and had played a pivotal role in securing the passage of an 
amendment, sponsored by Senator John McCain, to the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 clarifying that the international 
law ban on "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment" applies 
wherever U.S. officials operate.76 In addition, a series of 
investigative reports, including those conducted by the 
Pentagon, surrounding the publication of photos of torture by 
U.S. agents at Abu Ghraib found rampant violations of 
Convention rules, and recommended disciplinar� (and on 
occasion criminal) action against troops involved. 7 The U.S. 
Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector 
Operations likewise underwent revision in 2006, and emerged 
reinforcing the guidance that all interrogation operations were to 
be conducted within the constraints established by the McCain 
Amendment, the Geneva Conventions, and other relevant laws.78 
The examples could go on. 
Yet one might also identify various objections to this view. 
As was made apparent by the internal opposition the Bush 
Administration faced within the Pentagon when it moved to ease 
Geneva restrictions, Geneva Convention rules had been 
75. Obama Signs Order to Close Guantanamo Bay, CNN.COM (Jan. 22, 2009), 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/Ol/22/guantanamo.order/index.html. 
76. For a discussion of the role retired military leaders played in this and other anti­
torture initiatives, see Deborah Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive 
Power: Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L. J. 1255, 1279-88 (2006). 
77. See, e.g. , MAJ. GEN. ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 
800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (2004), available at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/ 
detainees/taguba/T AG UBA_REPORT _ CERTIFICA TIONS.pdf. 
78. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3: HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS (2006), available at http://www.army.mil/institution/ 
armypublicaffairs/pdf/fm2-22-3. pdf. 
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seemingly well internalized already by the U.S. Armed Forces­
in Army regulations implementing the Conventions, in field 
manual rules, in training programs, in legal instruction -in the 
years following Vietnam.7 It is possible that the domestic and 
international response to events like Abu Ghraib somehow 
solidified the internalization of these norms in a way that had 
not happened before, but the degree of difference is not entirely 
clear. And while some of the government responses to Bush 
Administration policies tended to reinforce Geneva norms, 
other responses have had more the opposite effect. For instance, 
in an amendment to the federal habeas corpus statute still on the 
books, Congress in 2006 barred individuals from so much as 
"invoking" the Geneva Conventions as a "source of rights" in 
any U.S. court.80 The effect, and legality, of this provision 
79. Military lawyers in particular pushed back vigorously against Bush 
Administration efforts to avoid the strictures of the Geneva regime. See, e.g., 151 CONG. 
REC. S8794 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (introducing into the 
congressional record memos prepared by service JAG officers, including Memorandum 
from Brig. Gen. Kevin M. Sandkuhler, Staff Judge Advocate to Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, to Gen. Counsel for the Dep't of the Air Force, Re: Working 
Group Recommendations on Detainee Interrogations (Feb. 27, 2003); Memorandum 
from Maj. Gen. Jack L. Rives, Deputy Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Air Force, to General 
Counsel for the Dep't of the Air Force, Re: Comment on Draft Report and 
Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational 
Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War 
on Terrorism (Feb. 6, 2003) ("[T]he use of the more extreme interrogation techniques 
simply is not how the U.S. armed forces have operated in recent history. We have taken 
the legal and moral 'high-road' in the conduct of our military operations regardless of 
how others may operate. Our forces are trained in this legal and moral mindset beginning 
the day they enter active duty. It should be noted that law of armed conflict and code of 
conduct training have been mandated by Congress and emphasized since the Viet Nam 
conflict when our POWs were subjected to torture by their captors. We need to consider 
the overall impact of approving extreme interrogation techniques as giving official 
approval and legal sanction to the application of interrogation techniques that U.S. forces 
have consistently been trained are unlawful."); Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Thomas J. 
Romig, Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Army, to Gen. Counsel for the Dep't of the Air 
Force, Re: Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Access the 
Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by 
the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (Mar. 3, 2003) ("While the OLC 
analysis speaks to a number of defenses that could be raised on behalf of those who 
engage in interrogation techniques later perceived to be illegal, the 'bottom line' defense 
proffered by OLC is an exceptionally broad concept of 'necessity.' This defense is based 
upon the premise that any existing federal statutory provision or international obligation 
is unconstitutional per se, where it otherwise prohibits conduct viewed by the President, 
acting in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, as essential to his capacity to wage war. I 
question whether this theory would ultimately prevail in either the U.S. courts or in any 
international forum. If such a defense is not available, soldiers ordered to use otherwise 
illegal techniques run a substantial risk of criminal prosecution or personal liability 
arising from a civil lawsuit.")). 
80. 28 U.S.C.A. § 224l(e) (2007) (attempting to strip the courts of jurisdiction over 
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remains to be tested conclusively.81 At a minimum, however, it 
must be seen as an obstacle to the enforcement of the Geneva 
Conventions that did not previously exist. 
D. INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST THE ONE-WAY RATCHET 
If the transnational legal process effect here seems 
uncertain, it may be more useful to consider a related 
explanation an international legal realist might offer. In this 
view, both Bush and Obama Administrations have pursued 
realist objectives. Both Administrations read treaty obligations 
in a way that serves the Executive's national security strategy; 
the Obama Administration simply has a somewhat different 
national security strategy than the Bush Administration did. The 
dramatic exchange of internal memos early in the Bush 
Administration with contrasting recommendations to the 
President regarding the applicability of the Geneva Conventions 
sheds useful light on this distinction. Then White House Counsel 
Alberto Gonzales had embraced the OLC view (described 
above) that the Third Geneva Convention had no application to 
the armed conflict with al-Qaeda, basing his argument in 
significant part on the Administration's strategic policy interests 
in "preserv[ing] flexibility" in the new "war against terrorism," 
facilitating the rapid collection of information from detainees, 
and leaving open future options for the treatment of non-state 
actors. 82 In response, then Secretary of State Colin Powell took a 
very different view of the strategic wisdom of the wholesale 
rejection of the application of Geneva to the conflict in 
habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees). The Obama Administration has also 
faced strong criticism for its decision not to pursue more aggressively criminal 
prosecution of former Bush Administration officials for their involvement with the 
torture of detainees in U.S. custody. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, When Presidential 
Sermons Collide, SALON.COM, Mar. 25, 2010, http://www.salon.com/ (search for "When 
Presidential Sermons Collide"; then follow "When Presidential Sermons Collide" 
hyperlink under "Archived Results") . Critics have voiced concern that failure to pursue 
prosecutions here will undermine the ability of Geneva Convention prohibitions against 
torture to deter officials in future conflicts. See, e.g., Mark Danner, If Everyone Knew, 
Who's to Blame, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/24/AR2009042402654.html?hpid=opinionsboxl. 
81. See Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002 (2010) (No. 09-35) (denying certiorari); 
Al Warafi v. Obama, 2101 WL 1404001, *10 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that the 2006 
amendment bars detainee from claiming in habeas proceeding that his detention is 
unlawful under the First Geneva Convention). 
82. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to the 
President of the United States, Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on 
Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), in THE 
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 20, at 118-21. 
548 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:523 
Afghanistan.83 Insisting that particularized determinations about 
the availability of prisoner-of-war protections to individual 
detainees leaves room for substantial strategic flexibility, Powell 
emphasized that a lack of adherence to the Geneva regime 
would have a significant negative impact on U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts, undermining cooperative relationships 
with allies, and limiting the power of U.S. moral authority to 
persuade wavering neutrals in the struggle against international 
terrorism. 84 
While the Obama Administration may not yet have had 
occasion to articulate its full understanding of the President's 
treaty interpretation power in general, its rhetoric surely 
embraces the Powell view of the United States' strategic 
interests in Geneva compliance in particular. As the President 
explained in a highly publicized May 2009 speech at the National 
Archives in Washington, D.C. :  
We uphold our most cherished values not only because doing 
so is right, but because it strengthens our country and it keeps 
us safe. Time and again, our values have been our best 
national security -asset-in war and peace; in times of ease 
and in eras of upheaval. Fidelity to our values is the reason 
why . . .  enemy soldiers have surrendered to us in battle, 
knowing they'd receive better treatment from America's 
Armed Forces than from their own government. It's the 
reason why America has benefitted from strong alliances that 
amplified our power, and drawn a sharp, moral contrast with 
our adversaries . . . .  And where terrorists offer only the 
injustice of disorder and destruction, America must 
demonstrate that our values and our institutions are more 
resilient than a hateful ideology.85 
For President Obama, the Bush interpretation of Geneva that 
enabled the use of waterboarding and the establishment of the 
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay "serve[ d] as a recruitment 
83. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, U.S. Sec'y of State, to the Counsel to the 
President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Draft Decision 
for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in 
Afghanistan, in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 20, at 122-25. 
84. Powell also urged than wholesale rejection of Geneva would potentially further 
endanger U.S. troops who fall into this or other enemies' hands, and confuse troops 
charged with detention operations (whose only training had been to Geneva Convention 
standards). Id. While starkly critical of the Gonzales/OLC view, the Powell memo took 
no position on the President's structural authority to interpret Geneva conclusively one 
way or another. 
85. Remarks by the President on National Security, supra note 32. 
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tool for terrorists, and increase[ d] the will of our enemies to fight 
us, while decreasing the will of others to work with America. "86 
In short, the Bush interpretation no longer served the Obama 
presidency's strategic approach to counterterrorism. For the 
realist, executive compliance, vel non, with international legal 
obligations is and ever has been a function of presidential 
political assessments of the national interest-and in this regard, 
it is in line with the one-way ratchet thesis. It just so happens 
that in this case, the political incentives to which the Executive is 
responding lead it to embrace rather than shun legal constraint. 
The notion that the two administrations have articulated 
differing views of their counterterrorism approaches at the 
strategic level is not difficult to accept. 87 It is likewise certainly 
true that the Obama interpretation of Geneva-to prohibit 
waterboarding, for example-is in line with the policy strategy 
the new Administration has articulated. But if the strategic 
interest explanation is right, the consequences for the one-way 
ratchet theory are severe. That is, this explanation for the 
Obama Administration's behavior would accept that the 
President responds to domestic and international political 
incentives (including allies' pressure to comply), but it would 
also suggest that those incentives might on occasion at least lead 
the ratchet to swing either way-toward greater or lesser 
assertions of executive power, or, at a minimum, to something 
other than a perennial executive commitment to power 
maximization over issues of national security. 
86. Id. The notion that the Bush approach was comprom1smg relations with 
international allies was hardly the President's alone. A remarkable study by a committee 
of the British Parliament reported that "Britain pulled out of some planned covert 
operations with the Central Intelligence Agency, including a major one in 2005, when it 
was unable to obtain assurances that the actions would not result in rendition and 
inhumane treatment." Raymond Bonner & Jane Perlez, British Report Criticizes U.S. 
Treatment of Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2007. The full report of the 
Committee is available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/upload/assets/www. 
cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publications/intelligence/20070725_isc_final.pdf. See also Craig 
Whitlock, Testimony Helps Detail CIA 's Post-9111 Reach, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2006, at 
Al (quoting State Department legal adviser John B. Bellinger III as indicating that 
ongoing disputes with U.S. allies have "undermined cooperation and intelligence 
activities"). 
87. See also Nobel Peace Prize, supra note 32; John Brennan, Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, A New Approach for 
Safeguarding Americans, Address Before the Ctr. for Strategic and Int'l Studies (Aug. 6, 
2009), available at http://csis.org/files/attachments/090806_brennan_transcript.pdf; Senate 
Confirmation Hearings: Eric Holder, Day One, N.Y. TIMES, , Jan. 16, 2009, at 11, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0l/16/us/politics/16text-holder.html? 
pagewanted=l l. 
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CONCLUSION 
If the realist explanation turns out to be a meaningful piece 
of the puzzle in this particular case, then there are interesting 
implications for both constitutional and international law. For 
constitutional law, the realist effect demonstrates the need to 
revisit and perhaps update our understanding of the political 
pressures facing the President, to better account for the pressure 
that may be applied by an international community with 
structures, laws and norms vastly better developed than those 
facing the Presidency as it stood at the founding, or immediately 
following World War II. For international law, the realist 
explanation offers another example of the ways in which 
international law, while often lacking in institutional 
enforcement mechanisms, may well shape state conduct 
nonetheless. Under any circumstances, it remains to be seen 
whether the Obama Administration's initial moves surrounding 
the Geneva regime will be sustained, or swamped by larger 
initiatives. In the meantime, this early example opens an avenue 
for greater exploration at the conclusion of the Administration's 
term. 
